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Faculty in American law
schools and universities often view
the award of tenure as an inviolate
guarantee of job security.' From
this perspective, any attempt to
monitor the level and quality of a
tenured professor's work infringes
on academic freedom. Recently,
however, academics have argued
that shielding the performance of
tenured faculty from serious
review potentially may be a
disservice
to the
academic
institution.2 Critics complain that
schools sacrifice
professional
accountability when
deficient
performance goes undetected and
uncorrected.3 Most recently, the
University of Minnesota Law
School, where "tenure
is no longer untouchable,"
4
addressed these issues.
Deficient performance, of course, can have different
roots and manifestations.
Some professors, perhaps
inadvertently, drift away from their mission of serving the
law school and the scholarly community. 5 Others may enter

a mid-career slump or may no longer
be able actively to satisfy their
responsibilities due to advanced age.6
Alternatively, some may experience a
stressful life event or suffer from an
identifiable and treatable problem that
prevents them from fulfilling their
professional responsibilities.
Senior faculty members who
are extremely underproductive or
detached from their work (in
teaching, scholarship, and/or service
to the law school and broader
university communities) arguably
represent the worst form of deficient
performance. They are often termed
"deadwood."7 They simply do not
contribute, in any important sense, to
the well-being of the institution.
How does this problem persist? One reason is that
some colleagues, out of a sense of duty to support one
another, occasionally cover for their lax counterparts."
Another answer is that the tenure system protects all
academics, even those whose contributions are not
considered worthwhile by their contemporaries, because
of the chance that future scholars might find their work
valuable.'
Some argue that the possibility that a few
scholars will not make any meaningful contributions at all
is the cost of preserving academic freedom."
How should the institution respond when tenured
faculty occupy positions and consume resources that
could be devoted to new faculty members who are more
energetic and productive? Is there adequate recourse for

Because it can be seen
both as a tool to foster
professional
development and as a
process for imposing
penalties, post-tenure
review has had a
mixed reception in the
academic community.
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correcting the problem without interfering with academic
freedom?
Depending on how it is defined and implemented, a
system of post-tenure review might be one answer for
providing a viable mechanism of quality control. If it is
seen as a tool to foster professional development, then
post-tenure review may benefit not only the institution
and academia as a whole, but also the individual professor
as well. Ideally, a system of post-tenure review would
bring the faculty together in a spirit of collegiality," so
that constructive criticism and feedback would be
available to a professor whose passion for the law,
teaching, and scholarship simply required reinvigoration
or some beneficial re-examination. On the other hand, if
the institution were to use post-tenure review primarily as
a process for imposing penalties, with a view toward
dismissing tenured faculty, it would certainly meet
substantial criticism.
It is thus no wonder that the concept of post-tenure
review has had a mixed reception in the academic
community."
For many of the reasons summarized
above, the American Federation of Teachers and the
National Education Association both favor post-tenure
review when used for faculty development.14 In contrast,
the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) opposes the idea:
"[P]eriodic formal
institutional evaluation of each post probationary faculty
member would bring scant benefit, would incur
unacceptable costs, not only in money and time but also
in a dampening of creativity and of collegial
relationships, and would threaten academic freedom.""5
The AAUP argues that existing quality controls such as
peer review of grants and publications, student evaluation
of teaching performance, periodic salary reviews, and
departmental review programs already improve the
performance of tenured faculty members. 6
This article examines the considerations for
evaluating whether to adopt a system of post-tenure
review. Part I discusses the primary issues prompting the
post-tenure review debate and explains the growing
controversy. Part IIexplores the arguments articulated by
faculty and administrators for and against post-tenure
review. Part III presents theoretical models of post-tenure
review and highlights prominent aspects of systems
currently utilized in the United States. Part IV compares
these theoretical models to the existing systems and
considers how to adapt post-tenure review to the unique
milieu of the law school. Part V presents studies that
have evaluated post-tenure review systems. Part VI
discusses the kind of professors whom post-tenure review
might identify and suggests potential responses to
deficient performance, including alternatives to posttenure review.

I.

ISSUES PROMPTING THE POST-TENURE
REVIEW DEBATE

This section surveys the issues that have prompted
the post-tenure review debate: public demand for
accountability and the recent elimination of mandatory
retirement in academic institutions. 7
A.

PUBLIC DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN
INSTITUTIONS

Higher education has come under attack" as tuition
costs continue to rise '" and access to such education
lessens for the middle class. The system of tenure, often
regarded by the public as a tool for protecting the "idle
and inert,"2 has emerged as a focal point for criticism.
One detractor complained: "Much of what is wrong with
American education at all levels today is tied up with the
boundless self-indulgence that results when people have
guaranteed jobs."2' The apparent grant of lifetime job
security may be "resented because it implies stability of
employment in an age of change and occupational
22'
tunnoil.
While some observers recognize the benefits of
tenure, others believe that these benefits do not outweigh
the costs: "While tenure can save out-of-pocket expenses
...it also increases overall costs, decreases flexibility,
disenfranchises the paying consumer of education,
increases dependence on unaccountable insiders, and
makes it nearly impossible to remove incompetent and
unnecessary professors."'
Law schools have not escaped the criticism: "If you
can't gain admission to heaven, the next best thing is
probably being a law college professor with tenure. It's
virtually impossible to lose the job and you certainly
24
won't perish if, as is likely the case, you don't publish."
While the critiques of educational institutions may
seem harsh and unfair, schools will have to become more
responsive to the demands for accountability in order to
regain the public's support. Public institutions may
receive more pressure to reform from citizens. All
schools, however, whether public or private, must address
the demands of their consumers-students.

B.

ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT IN
ACADEMIA

In addition to public demand for accountability, a
recent change in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) has intensified the debate over post-tenure
review.26 In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA to protect
older workers, employees between the ages of forty and
sixty-five, from discrimination in the workplace. 7 A
1978 amendment raised the age limit for forced
retirement to seventy. In 1986, ADEA amendments
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introduced a special rule for tenured faculty that allowed
mandatory-retirement policies for faculty of 70 years of
age.2" Congress repealed this statutory exemption for
colleges and universities effective January 1, 1994. 2
Since then, no university has attempted to uphold a
mandatory-retirement scheme in the courts, and American
courts have yet to decide on the legality of mandatory
retirement of tenured faculty."
Some fear that mandatory retirement might impinge
on the ability of a university to maintain an environment
that is conducive to academic freedom.31 The prohibition
against mandatory retirement might place a great strain on
academia by requiring universities to retain older faculty
members, even those performing at deficient levels. With
mandatory retirement no longer serving as one solution to
the problem of poor performance by tenured faculty,
academic institutions are seeking
alternative solutions,
2
including post-tenure review.1

Any institution that considers implementing posttenure review must contemplate the potential effects of a
system on the rights and morale of tenured professors, as
well as on the well-being of the institution as a whole.
Faculty members have two fundamental interests at stake:
academic freedom and job security. Traditionally, these
interests were addressed solely through tenure.33 More
recently, however, some commentators have argued that
the concept of post-tenure review can be reconciled with
both academic freedom and job security.' This section of
the article surveys the range of views on these two major
areas and considers other concerns that faculty members
may have about post-tenure review.

How can the warring ideals of accountability and
autonomy be reconciled?
William Hollingsworth
suggests that the mission of an academic institution can
be divided into two spheres: a transmission-of-knowledge
objective and a truth-seeking objective. 0 In the first
realm, a professor serves the institution and its students.
Here, professors must cede some of their autonomy
b6cause the institution demands accountability. 4' The
second sphere is that of research and outside service. In
this realm, the professor serves the larger academic
community by attempting to uncover truth. Autonomy is
crucial in this realm because subtle coercion threatens to
deter scholars from pursuing their sincere interests and
from publishing books and articles that threaten the status
quo.42
Within this scheme, post-tenure review is
appropriate only in the first realm. Functions such as
research and writing should be subject to review only
with substantial circumspection.43
The concern that all professors would be held to a
standard of "publish or perish" guides Hollingsworth's
desire to insulate the scholarly enterprise from post-tenure
review.
This standard of performance, which
Hollingsworth calls the "Widgets Producer model of
productivity,""
unyieldingly
demands
periodic
publication of research findings.4" Professors who pursue
long-term research projects that may not result in
published findings for years after their inception receive
unfavorable evaluations under this standard. In addition,
the standard penalizes researchers who collaborate with
others' or those who justifiably abandon a project after
several years of work because they rethink its value.47
Hollingsworth contends that tenured law professors
should be "exempt from the threat of publish or perish....
.[E]xcept in clear cases of sloth the exemption is an
essential component. of postprobationary academic
freedom, properly understood."4'

A.

B.

II.

MAJOR FACULTY CONCERNS THAT MUST

BE ADDRESSED WHEN CONSIDERING THE
IDEA OF POST-TENURE REVIEW

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Tenure has always represented a sacrosanct
safeguard of academic freedom,35 largely because of the
fear that McCarthy-esque harassment of academicians
could occur subtly under the guise of one evaluation
scheme or another. 6 Pursuant to this view, academic
freedom guarantees professors a certain level of
autonomy with regard to the material they choose to
teach, the methods they use to teach, and the research in
which they engage.37 Some authors have argued that
academic autonomy cannot be absolute, however, because3
there is a countervailing need for accountability.
Absolute autonomy has also faced challenges from
commentators who do not confine academic freedom to
the teaching
and research responsibilities of faculty
39
members.
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JOB SECURITY
Tenure may be seen as a "social contracf 49 in which
the professor and the institution trade costs in return for
benefits. The academician forgoes the higher wages that
the market might allow50 in order to gain academic
freedom,"' long-term employment stability, 2 the ability to
commit to long-term projects,53 and a guaranteed salary.
The institution reaps related benefits: it maintains a
relatively stable staff' and can occasionally offer
attractive positions to prospective faculty members. In
addition, the institution need not exhaust resources to
perform periodic monitoring after the probationary
period. A major risk of awarding tenure, of course, is
that the decision will prove unwise, leading to
inefficiency in its allocation of resources as the faculty
56
member becomes less productive.
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Some faculty object to post-tenure review because it

upsets the social contract's balance of costs and benefits.
They argue that subjecting tenured professors to periodic
formal reviews trivializes the initial grant of tenure.
Since tenure is awarded only after a lengthy and
presumably thorough probationary period, the procedure
already adequately tests the merit of accomplished
faculty, who then should not be subject to periodic "retenuring.
Other commentators assert that post-tenure review is
not incompatible with the institution of tenure. 8 Tenure
is no more an absolute grant ofjob security than academic
freedom is an absolute good. In some instances,
accountability to students or peers might advance learning
and "academic values" more than academic freedom
does. 9 Those who argue in favor of accountability claim
that tenure must not be seen as an unconditional grant of
employment.'
In the same vein, William W. Van
Alstyne of Duke Law School has said that tenure "lays no
claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment."6
Rather, he contends, "tenure provides only that no person
continuously retained as a full-time faculty member
beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary service
may thereafter be dismissed without adequate cause."'62
To those who claim that the probationary period has
presumptively established the tenured professor's merit,
Van Alstyne responds that academic due process still
allows for the dismissal of tenured professors:
It is but a limited statement that each faculty
member possessing [tenure] . . . is thought

worthy of a rebuttable presumption of
professional excellence in continuing service to
the institution. Thereafter, when termination
of [the professor's] services is sought for any
reason inconsistent with that presumption, it
requires only that the burden of justification be
fairly discharged under conditions of academic
due process by those with whom it properly
rests.63
C.

INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Faculty may share other concerns about the benefits
and practicality of post-tenure review that reflect their
interest in a quality environment in which to teach and do
research. Some argue that post-tenure review is a waste
of "scarce resources of faculty time and money for
identifying a small number of underperformers" and
generates ill will and competition among faculty
members.' Others see evaluation of tenured faculty as a
beneficial "mechanism for identifying resource targets"'65
that engenders no more factionalism than is already
present in the process of promotion and tenure.66 The
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competing arguments regarding post-tenure review may
be summarized as follows.67

Proponents contend that the benefits of post-tenure
review outweigh its possible costs. The expense incurred

in the review might result in substantially improved
performance by reinvigorated faculty, leading to the
efficient use of resources and avoidance of social costs
from continuing inadequate instruction or research. The

failure to implement post-tenure review could damage the
spirit or morale of the institution because the school

would

then

effectively

ignore

the

professional

development of its faculty. Furthermore, the system of
review could be merged with decisions about merit pay,

promotion,

or dismissal

for

cause

to

improve

administrative efficiency.68 Advocates of post-tenure
review also argue that the absence of such a process
would threaten the entire system of academic
management, deans and department heads included: if
"institutions don't assess their own performance, otherseither state or commercial organizations-will."'69 Given
today's political currents, post-tenure review might be
seen as a way to ward off "interference by outside
constituencies suspicious of tenure."7
Critics counter that existing methods of evaluation
render a post-tenure review scheme superfluous and
wasteful.7' While the concept might have "promise as a
method of delivering individually designed resource
supplements to faculty members with. . . real need for
them,"72 it results in a predictable approval and a trite
development plan.73
Since evaluating faculty
effectiveness in classroom teaching requires more time
than is required to evaluate legal scholarship, post-tenure
review might overemphasize the value of research and
prod professors to neglect their teaching duties in order to
publish.74 Moreover, opponents argue, post-tenure review
allows deans and department heads to avoid doing their
jobs; they should have face-to-face discussions with weak
faculty members,75 rather than create committees or
subcommittees to act as a buffer between the dean and
individual faculty.
Post-tenure review also raises the specter of
increased factionalism among tenured professors. Some
doubt that an institution can implement such a system
without sacrificing collegiality.76 This concern may have
particular weight at schools or in departments that already
suffer from deep political divisions. All factions must be
included in the development of post-tenure review;' if
the process is to succeed at these institutions, the
evaluations must be conducted with appropriate
sensitivity." In this sense, post-tenure review shares the
danger that accompanies tenure in the first place.79
Ultimately, the faculty must consider the mission and
climate of the institution, 0 as well as the benefits and
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pitfalls of tenure itself, in deciding whether to introduce
post-tenure review.

m1.MODEL POST-TENURE

REVIEW
PROGRAMS AND REPRESENTATIVE
SYSTEMS

If Swygert and Gozansky are correct that posttenure review is compatible with academic freedom and
job security, then administrators (presumably with faculty
involvement) must devise a system of review that
preserves the traditional safeguards of tenure.
Commentators who have studied the productivity of
tenured faculty have suggested various systems of
evaluation to reinvigorate faculty and boost productivity.
Although any institution must tailor a post-tenure review
program to its own mission, context, and culture, the
following models illustrate the range of possible systems.
A great deal more has been written on the topic of posttenure review of university faculty in general than of law
professors in particular. If read together, however, these
two branches of literature suggest mechanisms of posttenure review that might function well in a particular law
school.
A.

SWYGERT AND GozANsKY'S PERIODIC PEER
REVIEWS AND FACULTY COLLOQUIA

Michael Swygert and Nathaniel Gozansky have
posed two alternative models-periodic peer review and
faculty colloquia-for the review of tenured law
professors. Each model is premised on extensive faculty
involvement in the process of evaluating colleagues.
Under the model of periodic peer review,"' each senior
law-faculty member undergoes reviews of his or her
productivity every one or two years (no greater than
three-year intervals are recommended). The person under
review, tenured faculty, and the dean participate in the
review session, held in an informal group-discussion
format that should last no longer than one hour. Prior to
the review, the professor being evaluated is asked to
submit a dossier containing information relating to his or
her professional development, such as a list of
publications or awards and any works in progress. The
tone of the discussion should be informal and nonthreatening.
Its spirit should be one of "collegial
caring." 2 The goal of the discussion is not to intimidate
the faculty member, -but rather to provide collegial
support and feedback for the individual's professional
growth.
The standard of review is whether the faculty
member is "engaged in professionally and institutionally
worthwhile projects beyond teaching." 3 In considering
what is worthwhile, the reviewers should eschew
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consideration of a faculty member's political or
ideological orientation:
"A tenured faculty member
should not be placed in jeopardy because his or her
colleagues disagree with the substance, direction, or
thoroughness of scholarly activity."" To allow normative
judgment of the ideological bent of the professor would
be a severe encroachment on academic freedom. 5
This system of periodic peer review has several
purported benefits.
It facilitates the exchange of
suggestions and fresh insights among colleagues,
underscores the importance of persistent rather than
sporadic involvement in activities outside the classroom,
emphasizes the service obligations of the law-teaching
profession, fosters a collegial pride that could encourage
individual motivation, 6 and stems faculty inactivity. 7
Swygert and Gozansky offer another model of
review-faculty colloquia-as a secondary option"2 for
law schools that cannot implement the faculty peerreview method due to faculty apathy, competition, or
some other reason. 9 Under this model, approximately
every year' senior faculty members make presentations
to their colleagues on works in progress. (The authors
leave it to individual law schools to decide whether to
include presentations by junior faculty as well as senior
faculty.) As with periodic peer reviews, the climate for
faculty colloquia should be one - of constructive
conversation, with discussion and debate following the
presentation. This system is even more informal in tone
than the periodic peer review because there is no "hour of
judgment."'" Scholarly activity is encouraged rather than
coerced.92
B.

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII: HIERARCHICAL
STRUCTURE
The University of Hawaii ("Hawaii") is one of
several state universities with a significant research and
graduate mission that has implemented a system of posttenure review.9 3 The department chairs serve the primary
evaluative role at Hawaii, unlike in the Swygert and
Gozansky system of peer review. 4
Three basic principles guided the framers of
Hawaii's post-tenure review system.95 First, the review
should reflect the nature of the individual's field of work
and conform to fair and reasonable expectations as
recognized by faculty peers in the relevant department or
discipline. Second, the review must present no threat to
an individual faculty member's tenure.
Third, the
evaluation must encourage professional growth and
thereby enhance the contributions of those involved.
The system of post-tenure review in place at the
University of Hawaii has far more structure than either of
the two models offered by Swygert and Gozansky.
Initially, faculty within each university department
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prioritize expected standards of performance, which then
make up the departmental guidelines.96 Each year, faculty
members file a r~sum6-type document with the
department chair, reporting professional accomplishments
for the previous year.97 The chair then notifies those
faculty members who are due for review. Untenured
faculty and those who have been reviewed within the last
five years or have been awarded promotions, tenure, or a
merit salary increase" are exempt. Faculty members who
are up for review submit to the department chair any
additional information that they would like to have
considered.
The department chair then evaluates the faculty
member's performance against departmental guidelines.
If the faculty member compares favorably, the review
ends. If the chair finds deficiencies in teaching, research,
or service, however, a faculty development plan will be
devised. Should the faculty member desire feedback
from colleagues in designing the plan, a committee of
peer faculty is available to help. The department is
authorized to commit resources to implement the faculty
member's plan, and the dean's approval can be sought if
implementatioi requires extra-departmental resources.
While the Hawaii plan designates the department
chair to carry out post-tenure review, there are provisions
to include other members of the institution when a dispute
arises. For example, if the chair and the faculty member
cannot agree that performance has been deficient, a
university-wide faculty evaluation-review committee will
be called upon to make a final decision. Should the
department chair and faculty member fail to formulate a
mutually agreeable development plan, the dean of the
particular school will be called upon to mediate the
dispute.
C.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN: REVIEW OF
SUPERLATIVE AND DEFICIENT FACULTY

In April 1993, in response to a mandate of the Board
of Regents, the University of Wisconsin ("Wisconsin")
implemented a post-tenure review system. 99 The primary
focus of Wisconsin's review system has been to foster
professional development 00 rather than to punish poor
performance. 1" The review of faculty has been linked
with the merit process already in use, as a response to
faculty members' concern that the review would create
unnecessary bureaucracy.' 2 Pursuant to the review
system, all tenured faculty members will be reviewed
every five years by one or more tenured professors.0 3 In
addition, the system of post-tenure review itself will be
evaluated annually. "o
This version of post-tenure review ensures that all
tenured faculty members will be reviewed several times
during their careers. Thus, the Wisconsin system is

considered to be less punitive than the Hawaii system
because the reviews are not conducted as a result of poor
performance in the past. The Wisconsin system was
created both to reduce faculty anxiety about the reviews
and to foster excellence. 5 In addition, each department's
executive committee must establish written criteria and
procedures concerning the post-tenure review process.
The review examines a faculty member's
performance over the previous five years with reference
to his or her dossier and career plans for the future. The
reviewer(s) may interview others who have knowledge of
the faculty member's work."°
After completing the
review, the reviewer(s) must provide the professor with a
copy of the report, to which the professor may file a
written response. The appropriate dean maintains all of
these documents. The review system does not include a
provision for a career-development plan.
The departments keep records of the reviews
completed and the department chairs annually report the
outcome of the reviews to the dean. Wisconsin's policy
of post-tenure review does not include language
concerning actions that would be taken as a result of a
poor evaluation. Since the policy enumerates procedures
for recordkeeping and documentation, however, it is
likely that the reviews could be used as evidence toward
dismissal for cause.
D.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO:

A SYSTEM

OF

REWARDS

The Board of Regents instituted post-tenure review
at the University of Colorado ("Colorado") in 1982.107
Colorado implemented the post-tenure review program as
a part of a movement to "define, strengthen and qualify
tenure" in the early 1980s."0 8 Its original purpose "was to
identify faculty members whose excellent work could be
enriched by targeted [and] specialized support and those
whose flagging efforts might be invigorated by
thoughtfully designed and delivered aid.""°
Thus,
Colorado's system of post-tenure review revolves around
funding: the system seeks to foster faculty productivity
by providing additional resources.
Each faculty member is subject to peer review once
every five to seven years. Reviews can be made in
conjunction with the annual merit reviews."0 The review
process includes an examination of the professor's
dossier, a written report by the reviewer(s), and the
development plan, if needed."'
According to a
comparison study conducted by the Florida Board of
Regents, the most effective part of the Colorado system of
review is the "requirement for self-evaluation against a
set of previously agreed upon standards."".2
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E.

VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE:
TERMINATION AS A CONSEQUENCE

In 1996, the State Council of Higher Education for
Virginia mandated that all state colleges and universities
develop a system of post-tenure review."' As a result of
this mandate, Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("Virginia
Tech") designed a system of post-tenure review that will
be implemented in 1998."" Virginia Tech designed the
program to provide for termination as a possible
consequence of chronically poor performance."' In the
past, it was difficult to dismiss a tenured faculty member
for consistently poor performance. Attempts to dismiss
for this cause typically ended in a conflict between the
department head and the faculty member and resulted in
litigation." 6
The post-tenure review program will begin with the
faculty of each department creating minimum standards
that will be used during the annual evaluations currently
employed by Virginia Tech."' This program focuses on
the subgroup of professors whose performance is
deficient. "It would have been wonderful to have used
periodic review of all faculty as an occasion to celebrate
their many extraordinary contributions, but we couldn't
justify the time that such review would consume."".
Thus, the only faculty members who will be evaluated are
those who receive an "unsatisfactory" evaluation for two
consecutive annual reviews." 9
The peer review, conducted by the departmental
promotion and tenure committee, can result in
certification of satisfactory performance 20 or certification
of deficiencies.
If the professor's performance is
determined to be deficient, then the committee can
recommend dismissal for cause, a sanction other than
dismissal,' 2 ' or a period of remediation.I
IV. COMPARING THE ALTERNATIVES
This section of the article compares the different
systems of review at the institutions discussed above with
the models proposed by Swygert and Gozansky. It also
examines the applicability of the various systems to the
law school setting.

purpose is to nurture professional development for all
faculty members. This focus is consistent with Swygert
and Gozansky's models of periodic peer review and
faculty colloquia; both seek to create "a spirit of collegial
caring,"'" support, and feedback.
Some institutions articulate faculty discipline as a
second rationale for implementing systems of post-tenure
review. Their procedures are punitive in nature and
provide for the dismissal of tenured faculty members who
have records of poor performance. Virginia Tech's
system, for example, provides for the termination of
tenured professors performing at deficient levels. The
theory underlying a punitive system contradicts the
principles set forth by Swygert and Gozansky.
The third rationale behind the implementation of
post-tenure review is the desire to meet demands for
accountability from outside constituencies. This rationale
is likely the primary objective of legislatures when they
mandate post-tenure review systems by statute.
Swygert and Gozansky do not emphasize this factor, but
it is becoming increasingly important with the public's
growing demand for accountability.
Post-tenure review seems superfluous without some
clear policy that attempts to solve the problem of sub-par
performance.
If the faculty members are generally
productive, then Swygert and Gozansky's models of
informal intercollegial support may work to encourage a
faculty member to be more productive.' 25 If an institution
has a widespread problem of faculty deficiencies, then for
purposes of both accountability and budgetary
responsibility, invocation of a termination process might
prove to be the better course.
The feasibility of post-tenure review in any school
depends greatly on its purported rationale. Given the
politically charged climate that often permeates law
schools, a punitive system might threaten academic
freedom in law schools more so than in other academic
institutions. Even the developmental rationale may be
unable to co-exist effectively with the politics of a law
school. On the other hand, law schools, too, must remain
accountable to their students.
B.

A.

RATIONALES AND RESULTS

An analysis of the different systems indicates that
there are three driving forces behind the implementation
of post-tenure review:
faculty development, faculty
discipline, and academic accountability.
Most
universities declare faculty development as their primary
rationale. These universities claim that their purpose is to
foster growth in the areas of teaching, scholarship, and
service. The University of Wisconsin and University of
Colorado systems best exemplify this rationale. Their
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FACULTY INVOLVEMENT

Most systems involve some form of review by
faculty peers. The degree of peer involvement in
different systems varies from minimal participation to
extensive cooperation. Swygert and Gozansky's models
for law schools have the highest level of peer
involvement. An examination of the various other
systems, however, illustrates that such extensive peer
involvement is far from universal.
At the University of Hawaii, faculty members are
involved in formulating the standards for review in each
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department, but they do not perform the actual evaluation.
The department chair conducts the review. Faculty
members become involved as reviewers only if there is a
dispute between the department chair and the individual
under review.
At Virginia Tech, faculty members create the
minimum department standards used in the post-tenure
review process, and perform the reviews as well. 26
Similarly, the Wisconsin and the Colorado programs
place peer faculty members at the core of the process.
The notion of peer involvement in post-tenure
review systems may be a different question for law
schools than for universities as a whole. There are several
factors that might be considered in determining the
appropriate level of peer involvement: the size of the
school, the political climate, the lack of internal
departments, and the dean's role and relationship with the
faculty. Typically, law school faculties are much smaller
in size than other divisions of academic institutions. With
small-scale faculties, the deans may have more time to
devote to each faculty member; in addition, annual merit
evaluations may be sufficient, rendering peer reviews
superfluous. Furthermore, anonymity for peer reviewers
would likely be more difficult to provide in law schools
than in larger institutions.
political
a
highly
charged
Additionally,
environment, which is characteristic of many law schools,
may be detrimental to the effectiveness of faculty
involvement in the peer-review process. Factionalization
in a law school may render professors unable to provide
honest, objective, accurate reviews of their peers, as well
as reviews that would not be respected by the recipient,
thus resulting in faculty participation being wholly
ineffectual. In this scenario, both the vengeful peer
review and the mutual back-scratching type of peer
review are possible and will undermine the integrity of a
post-tenure review system.
One answer to this difficulty may be to have greater
university participation in the process. As a discrete
academic unit, law schools often are not subject to the
same direct control and oversight as are other university
subdivisions. In the peer-review process, however, the
involvement of university administrators and faculty in
the law school's peer-review process might serve to
defuse partisan tensions. Although faculty at a relatively
autonomous law school may resent such apparent
encroachment, university participation may be the price
that a law school has to pay to have a fair and respected
post-tenure review system.
Another answer is that, since law school faculty
members elect their deans, a trusted, well-respected dean
who poses no competitive threat to individual faculty
members may be a more effective reviewer than would a

fellow professor. On the other hand, peer reviews may be
more necessary in a smaller faculty, because the dean
may be more willing to overlook deficient performance
when the professor is a close colleague or friend. Further,
for a dean to review more than a handful of tenured
faculty each year may take too much time from his or her
many other responsibilities.
The foregoing are factors that will have to be
weighed. Circumstances will undoubtedly vary from one
law school to another. Thus, schools should consider the
needs of their faculty and make decisions regarding
faculty involvement in the review process accordingly.
C.

TIME INTERVALS

Swygert and Gozansky recommend that post-tenure
reviews occur at least every three years. 27 None of the
universities surveyed in this article performs reviews that
often. Hawaii and Wisconsin evaluate every five years;
Colorado evaluates every five to seven years. At Virginia
Tech, it is possible that a faculty member will never
receive an evaluation. The frequency of evaluations
depends on faculty needs, available resources, and the
institution's rationale for adopting post-tenure review.
Like faculty involvement, the issue of time intervals
raises different questions for law schools than for other
academic institutions. Since the process of review can be
costly, for example, monetary considerations will arise. It
may be that private law schools are in a better position
than public law schools to afford programs that provide
for more frequent review and, therefore, may be more
inclined to implement them. The focus on accountability,
however, may be more acute in the public context.
Also, administrators should consider whether their
faculty have the requisite time to perform effective peer
evaluations. 28 Because law school faculties are smaller
in size, the time demands may not be as burdensome as
they are at other colleges or schools within a university.
On the other hand, it is probably true that the smaller the
faculty the greater the committee burden already for each
individual; to add to this burden might be both
unwarranted and counterproductive. Moreover, there
may be less of a need in law schools for frequent reviews,
as unproductive members are easier to identify within the
smaller pool of faculty. Contrariwise, law schools that
select many of their faculty from high-powered, highly
stressful law practices may find a greater percentage of
their faculty who suffer from burnout and mid-career
slumps; at these schools, reviews with greater frequency
might make more sense.
Each law school should consider these issues and
factors carefully, and make decisions with respect to the
frequency of reviews in accordance with the school's
individual characteristics.
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V.

STUDIES EVALUATING POST-TENURE
REVIEW

Several universities have conducted studies of their
post-tenure review process. These evaluations served an
essential purpose: to determine whether the review
process was working effectively to achieve its objectives.
To evaluate systems in use, one investigator sent
questionnaires to twenty-six different universities that had
some form of post-tenure review process."z Some of the
respondent universities had implemented summative
reviews (merit/salary based); others had implemented
formative reviews (developmental, periodic, non-salary
based). 30 The results of the study indicated that most of
the respondents favored post-tenure review 3 ' and
believed that it was beneficial to the university, although
the systems were more effective with star faculty 3than
they were with faculty performing at deficient levels. 1
The problems most frequently mentioned by faculty
and administrators were: ineffective implementation and
development plans for faculty performing at deficient
levels, lack of a reward system, inadequate training of
lack of mechanisms to measure
evaluators, 3and
3
competence.
Most respondents agreed that the reviews should
identify faculty performing at deficient levels, but there
was little agreement on whether the reviews were
effective in serving that purpose. 34 Many respondents
recommended that there be both implementation of
faculty development programs with multiple sources of
input, 135 and material consequences for favorable as well
as unfavorable reviews, typically in the form
of
36
development plans or recognition and incentives.
In 1989, all four of the University of Colorado
campuses conducted a study on the implementation and
success of post-tenure review.3 7 The study consisted of
questionnaires and interviews of faculty members, deans,
department chairs, and administrators who had taken part
in the post-tenure review system. 3 1 The responses ranged
from cautious optimism, to mild offense, to violent
offense, to outright indifference. 39
Respondents
consistently articulated concerns over scarce resources
and regrets of time and energy expended. 140 Many
believed thatf a post-tenure review process was
unnecessary to identify deadwood because everyone
already knows who is underproductive. The results of the
study indicated that proponents and opponents agreed that
post-tenure review cannot succeed if it is intended or
designed to threaten or revoke tenure.' 4 ' Respondents
viewed post-tenure review as promising only if designed
as a mechanism for re-energizing faculty members with
less energy 42and lifting already productive members to
new levels.
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Based on its study, the University of Colorado
recommended to its Regents the following: the purpose
of post-tenure review should be faculty development; a
resource base of $250,000 should be set aside annually
for the post-tenure review system; a written report with
recommendations and thorough feedback on results of all
reviews should be provided to the faculty through
conferences with the review committees; external reviews
should always be permitted, and should be required when
there is a difference of opinion or upon request; and the
office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs should
develop a clear definition of excellence in faculty
performance that addresses teaching, research, creative
work, and service and considers the mission of the
department or the institution.'
Madeleine Goodman evaluated the effectiveness and
the results of the post-tenure review system at the
University of Hawaii.'" The review process produced
some expected results of fulfilled professionaldevelopment plans, as well as some unanticipated
outcomes.
When the administration announced the names of
the professors to be reviewed, the university experienced
a surge of extramural grant submissions. 4 ' Faculty
members submitted 5.7 % more grants than in the
previous year, and
funding for those proposals rose
14 6
seventeen percent.
In the first review period, 245 professors (twentyfour percent of the tenured faculty) were eligible for
review, because they had not received promotions or
merit adjustments in the previous five years. 147 Upon
announcement of the professors scheduled for review,
thirty-seven faculty (fifteen percent of the faculty under
review) decided to retire, thus exempting them from
further evaluation. 14 1
Of the 206 professors who
underwent review in the first cycle, the department chairs
determined that 144 (seventy percent) had no
deficiencies. 149 Forty-six faculty (twenty-two percent)
were identified as exhibiting deficiencies; these faculty
devised development plans to address their weaknesses. 5 °
The remaining sixteen professors (eight percent) appealed
the findings of the department chairs.'
After evaluating the system, administrators modified
the format of the development plans. The new format
requires the plans to do the following: identify specific
deficiencies; list objectives that address those
deficiencies; specify activities to implement the plan; and
establish timelines for meeting the objectives.' 52 In
addition, department chairs will review the professors'
progress annually, and, if necessary, may commit funds
for implementing the plans.
During the six years that Hawaii used the modified
post-tenure review system, 618 tenured faculty members
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(fifty-eight percent) were evaluated; seventy-two have
While
created professional development plans."s
disciplinary action might feasibly have been employed, it
"has remained only a potential, important as a possibility
in a few extreme cases, but not yet actually invoked."' 55
Goodman concluded that "the program has tended to
sense of purpose
enhance faculty morale and the faculty's
156
and engagement in their disciplines."'
VI. FURTHER QUESTIONS

A.

WHAT KINDS OF PROFESSORS WILL BE
IDENTIFIED THROUGH POST-TENURE REVIEw?

The concept of post-tenure review presupposes a
standard of performance against which individual faculty
members are to be measured. Several authors have
illustrated the types of deficiencies that they believe posttenure review can identify and correct by describing
prototypical professors who have some of the
characteristics associated with nonproductivity.
Goodman, for example, after evaluating the results
of the first round of post-tenure review at the University
of Hawaii, described four distinct types of faculty
members that the review process had identified: 1 the
professor suffering from a "mid-career slump"; the "aging
faculty member"; the "alienated full professor"; and the
"nonfunctioning professor."' 8 Goodman suggested ways
for dealing with each of these deficient faculty members.
The professor who is caught in a "mid-career
slump,"'" 9 according to Goodman, has simply fallen into a
rut. He or she may have ceased performing innovative
research and instead focuses on teaching routine classes;
this professor needs some reinvigoration of interest. This
can be accomplished through a well-crafted development
plan featuring concrete research objectives. The faculty
member may also benefit from some assistance in
coordinating applications for grants and the like.
The professor who is no longer able to manage full
schedules of both teaching and research because of
advancing years should, according to Goodman, be dealt
with in a spirit of respect and compromise. Such an
individual would benefit from a reasonable and flexible
restructuring of duties. Strong performance in one area
should offset some deficiencies in another, so that a very
strong teacher should be forgiven for shortcomings in the
area of research."W
Goodman's third prototype, the "alienated full
professor,"'' requires a different approach, because the
problem is not that the faculty member is incompetent or
nonproductive, but rather that the individual has become
estranged from the mainstream of the department. The
lack of common ground between the professor and the
faculty may be due to some fundamental ideological or
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philosophical difference of opinion. In such a situation,
there will be inherent friction between the professor and
any administrative official who attempts to evaluate
professional performance. The review process may need
a mechanism such as a faculty-wide committee.
The fourth type of professor perceived by Goodman
may be called the "nonfunctioning professor."' 62 This
faculty member simply has some identifiable and perhaps
treatable problem (personal, emotional, or life event) that
prevents proper performance of professorial duties. In
some institutions, the shortcomings of this individual will
have long been undetected because fellow faculty, in a
spirit of collegiality, have adhered to a tradition of
"covering for" another who was having trouble. A
properly implemented system of post-tenure review,
however, may provide an opportunity for the faculty
peers to document these shortcomings without violating
63
institutional norms of collegial support.
While Goodman's typology (written to apply to an
entire university system) refers to various types of
inadvertent neglect or boredom, Swygert and Gozansky
have focused on only one type of "deficient" professor:
In their
the underpublished, tenured law professor."
investigation, forty-four percent of tenured law professors
evaluated had no "publication events" during the three to
four years prior to the study. 65 This result demonstrated
that there was a crisis of "underutilization of the law
teaching profession's intellectual resources"" in the legal
community.
In order to spur greater productivity
(ostensibly measured in terms of frequency of
publication), Swygert and Gozansky suggested the
periodic peer review and faculty colloquia models."6
Their ideal remedy for this type of deficiency is peer
encouragement.
Education-law attorney Brian Brooks believes that
"categorizing" certain types of behavior which provide
grounds for dismissal... neglects the essential inquiry:
why does the particular behavior amount to adequate
determine
cause for dismissal?'1 6 He formulated a test6to
9
when a professor's performance is deficient.1
The first part of the test requires the institution to
identify professors who exhibit "an inability or
unwillingness to contribute to the advancement of truth
and knowledge through effective teaching, research,
scholarship and contributions to the community.' 70
Second, the professor must exhibit an inability or
unwillingness to perform his or her duties "for such a
period of time that improvement is unlikely, or be so
egregious that rehabilitation is improbable or
The third prong requires that the
impractical." 7'
professor's academic peers make the findings regarding
incompetence.'
The final element is that the findings
"should be examined in light of the general
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understandings and customs of the particular university
and the academic community as a whole."'"
In contrast to the previous commentators, law
professor William Hollingsworth opposes post-tenure
review in law schools. Instead of suggesting criteria for
describing archetypal professors whom he would like to
see identified through a system of post-tenure review, he
describes professors whom he believes might be
improperly branded by peers through such a review.'
For example, he points out that post-tenure review may
single out a professor for sanction merely because he or
ihe has engaged in nonconventional research. 75 If this
professor were to be earmarked for being an allegedly
"unreasonable" scholar, this would violate his academic
freedom. Hollingsworth concludes that there should be
no standard 76of "reasonableness" in the field of legal
scholarship.
How SHOULD THEY BE DEALT WITH?
Advocates of post-tenure review characterize the
ideal goal of any system as professional development
rather than punishment.'" The traditional views of tenure
as a guarantor of academic freedom and job security
make the threat of dismissal problematic. 78 But when, if
ever, should a faculty member be placed at risk of other
penalties?
For those who oppose the dismissal of tenured
179
faculty for alleged underproductivity in any event,
B.

several lesser sanctions may appear to be feasible. For
example, access to scholarly support (research assistance,
books, travel allowances, secretarial help) might be
This measure is arguably inappropriate,
restricted.
however, since the Association of American Law Schools
wrote into its bylaws the duty of member schools to
support the scholarship and academic freedom of its
180
faculty.
Might salary reductions be an appropriate measure
to penalize underproductivity? Hollingsworth argues that
salary cannot comfortably be keyed to productivity
because the non-market component of a professor's value
cannot be easily measured.' 8
What about "counseling" by the dean to encourage
an individual to be more productive? Hollingsworth
concedes that this approach could be of some value, but
only if the dean is fair and open-minded and does not
attempt to dictate the research goals of the professor.'
Indeed, providing advice within a genuinely open
dialogue represents "permissive caring,"'8 the opposite of
coercion, but only as long as the advice is not "so
repetitive as to become nagging.""
Other possible sanctions include academic probation
or loss of tenure. At the University of New Mexico, for
example, a deficient professor can be placed on a two-
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If the professor then fails to
year probation." 5
in the area of teaching," he or
improvement
"demonstrate
6
she can lose tenure.1
C.

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES TO POST-TENURE

REVIEW?
Several alternatives exist for those schools that
believe that post-tenure review is unnecessary or
infeasible. The AAUP proposes quality controls, such as
periodic salary reviews, peer review of grants and
teaching
of
evaluations
student
publications,
performance, and departmental review programs. 87 In
addition, whether or not an institution uses post-tenure
review, it has the option of removing faculty for adequate
The following discussion surveys these
cause.
alternatives to post-tenure review.
Many institutions require annual evaluations of
faculty to determine the extent of salary increases. As
one professor has noted, "we are rated annually according
to the quality and quantity of our accomplishments in
teaching, research and scholarship, and service."'8 These
review mechanisms are not perfect substitutes for each
Merit evaluations look to past
other, however.
performance and are directly connected to salary
increases. Post-tenure reviews, by contrast, focus on
professional development and career objectives.
One creative approach to post-tenure review, now in
use at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad
Law Center, involves the use of "five-year plans," or
"personal blueprints."' 89 This method of review---"[a]
multi-year professional plan that addresses individual
productivity [and which] will be useful in warding off
outside intrusion""--calls for each faculty member to
outline his or her professional goals in the areas of
teaching, scholarship, and service. As part of the
program, the dean "review[s] each individual plan in
conjunction with all others to determine if [the school's]
overarching institutional needs will be served if the
proposed personal blueprints are accepted."''" The plans,
as well as the resulting rewards-including salary
increase, course package, class schedule, and level of
research assistance 92-are made public. "In this way, all
of us will share what we plan to give to the common
enterprise, how we expect to be measured, and how we
want to be rewarded... [T]his process will allow each of
us to more fully appreciate the quality and diversity of
our contributions to the institutional mission."' 3 Nova's
hybrid approach incorporates the forward-looking aspects
of other methods of post-tenure review. It also eliminates
some of the politics associated with peer review. On the
other hand, with the dean as the sole reviewer of each
professor's proposed plan, close friendships between the
dean and individual faculty may be hard to ignore. In
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addition, this scheme is time-intensive, particularly in the
years that the dean is considering whether to accept
faculty plans. (In intervening years, the faculty member
would be measured against the already-accepted plan.)
Student evaluations of a faculty member provide
another means by which to measure the professor's
performance. An effective teaching-evaluation process will
inquire into students' opinions of, among other things, the
professor's ability to communicate the course material and
expectations, to organize the course, and to stimulate
student interest."9 "Consistently poor evaluations, solicited
over a period of time, strongly indicate that a professor is
not performing his classroom duties competently."' 95 Thus,
student evaluations used in this manner may serve as a
substitute for post-tenure review. These evaluations only
measure the professor's teaching ability, however, and do
not inquire into contributions in the areas of research,
scholarship, and service. Nor are student evaluations the
only method--or even the best method-for assessing
teaching performance.
Termination of faculty is another alternative to posttenure review. The AAUP allows for dismissal of faculty
The American Bar
members for "adequate cause."'"
Association has adopted AAUP's statement as its
suggestion for law school tenure policy.' 97 Neither body,
The
however, clearly defines "adequate cause."' 198
Commission on Academic Tenure articulated a definition
in 1973, stating that adequate cause in faculty dismissal
proceedings should be restricted to "(a) demonstrated
incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research, (b)
substantial and manifest neglect of duty, and (c) personal
conduct which substantially impairs the individual's
fulfillment of his institutional responsibilities."'"
One author has divided into categories the types of
causes that the courts have allowed for dismissal of
faculty: insubordination, neglect of duty, incompetence,
and moral turpitude.2" The fact that many tenure cases
develop into legal disputes suggests that institutions
contemplating the adoption or implementation of a posttenure review system should also consider the legal
consequences of that system. A tenure contract has been
deemed to confer property rights, for which due process
must be provided. Brooks suggests that, as long as
procedural due process has been followed, the courts will
generally leave undisturbed a negative outcome based on
adequate cause.2° ' He defines due process as "notice of
the names of those making allegations and the nature and
factual basis of those allegations, a reasonable amount of
time to present a defense, and a hearing before an actually
impartial and unbiased tribunal, committee or board.""2 2
Brooks notes, however, that, if First Amendment or other
public policy considerations outweigh the cause for

dismissal, then the court may find against the
institution.2 3
The possibility of litigation makes dismissal for
cause both costly and time-consuming for the institution.
Schools may also have difficulty demonstrating adequate
cause if they have not previously documented the
professor's performance. Consequently, this option may
prove to be impractical for institutions that do not use
post-tenure review.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prevailing political winds shaped the post-tenurereview debate and dropped it on the doorstep of the
academy and the legislature, leaving questions about the
value of tenure. Current conceptions about the proper
role of tenure in academic institutions, as well as the
enduring mission or spirit of each law school, inform the
decision to inaugurate post-tenure review and the
Even if tenure can
evaluation process itself.
accommodate increased accountability through posttenure review, faculty members must weigh their capacity
for apolitical, reasoned peer evaluation against the
possibility that systemized criticism would do more harm
than good. Though borne by a gust of good intentions,
such evaluations could leave the school poorer, divided,
and listless. On the other hand, post-tenure review has
the potential to enrich students, faculty, the law school,
and the society at large. But post-tenure review is only
one response to the problem of underproductive faculty.
Whether to adopt this response depends on the context
and culture of the institution. It may well be that, at a law
school that has a trustworthy, fair, and open-minded dean,
a formal system of post-tenure review is unnecessary. It
may also be that, at a school that has a deeply divided
faculty, a formal system of post-tenure review is
unworkable. Within these extremes, there are many
alternatives.
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FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE No. 5022 (Aug. 23, 1991).

Paychecks for Life?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 5,

33 The definition of tenure itself is not without controversy.

FREEDOM: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995)
(identifying seven discrete waves of zealous criticism leveled
against higher education since the Civil War, including modem
attacks).
19

20

1995, at A6.
21

Thomas Sowell, Tenure Versus Teaching, FORBES, Nov. 21,

1994, at 96.
22 Manuel T. Pacheco, An Experiment, Arizona International
Campus May Become a Test Sitefor Tenure, ARIz. DAILY STAR,
Jan. 11, 1996, at II A. See also Leonhardt, supra note 3.
2 Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Academic Tenure:
An Economic Critique, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 545, 546
(1991).
24 Warren, Possey & Tybor, Not to Publish is Not to Perish,
CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 11, 1985, at 1.
25

Nova University's Shepard Broad Law Center, a private law

school in Florida, recently abolished tenure in favor of five-year
continuing contracts.
See Klein, supra note 4, at A20.
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Fifty-eight years ago, the AAUP formulated the following
definition:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1)
freedom of teaching and research and of extramural
activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic
security to make the profession attractive to men
and women of ability. Freedom and economic
security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations
to its students and to society.
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3
(1990), cited in Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Good Cause and Just
Expectations: Academic Tenure in Oklahoma'sPublic Colleges
and Universities,46 OKLA. L. REV. 205, 207 (1993).
34 "At least a few institutions and academicians are beginning

to understand that periodic performance appraisals of tenured
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faculty competence can be accomplished without threatening or
eroding the academic and political freedoms afforded by
tenure." Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 1, at 363. See
Honan, supra note 4, at 21 ("Fred L. Morrison, a University of
Minnesota law school professor who has been a faculty leader in
the negotiations [for post-tenure review] said '[t]he new
proposal, in my view, meets all of the faculty concerns for
academic freedom, due process and protection of
employment.').

141, 146 (1991). Hollingsworth is a Professor of Law at The
University of Tulsa College of Law. See also Jeremy Epstein,
Academic Tenure Isn'tJust a Matter ofMoney, NAT'L L.J., Dec
8, 1997, at A24 (concluding that, since tenure helps to promote
robust public debate, it "does not simply protect the tenured; it
protects all of us"); Happel, supranote 1.
38

See Goodman, supra note 3, at 409.

See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 16, at 1421 (recognizing the
"[a]cademic freedom of the peer review body to make
professional judgments without external pressure").
39

Controversy over the definition of this term parallels the
debate over the proper scope of academic liberty or autonomy.
First, consider the definition advanced by William W. Van
Alstyne of Duke Law School:
3.

"[A]cademic freedom" is characterized by a
personal liberty to pursue the investigation,
research, teaching, and publication of any subject as
a matter of professional interest without vocational
jeopardy or threat of other sanction, [except] upon
adequate demonstration of an inexcusable breach of
professional ethics in the exercise of that freedom.

40

Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 145.

41

See id. at 156-57.

Hollingsworth concedes that a
compromise of autonomy is necessary in the classroom:
"Although academic freedom in the classroom should be
defined very liberally, it must accommodate some need for
professional reasonableness in order to protect students' right to
learn." Id.
42 1d. at 146.

William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE
CONCEPT OF AcADmIC FREEDoM 59 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed.,
1975), quoted in Burton M. Leiser, Threats to Academic
Freedom and Tenure, 15 PACE L. REv. 15, 43 (1994). An
editorialist for The New York Times advanced a less charitable
definition in 1916:
Academic freedom, that is, the inalienable right of
every college instructor to make a fool of himself
and of his college by ... intemperate, sensational

prattle about every subject under heaven, to his
classes and to the public, and still [stay] on the
payroll or be reft therefrom only by elaborate
process, is cried to all the winds by the organized
dons.
Kesselman, supra note 26, at 209 n.9 (internal citations
omitted).

See also Licata, supra note 14, at 26 (noting
possibility that faculty members would face pressure to conform
to the views of their colleagues or avoid controversial research
subjects).
Alternatively, at politically liberal academic
institutions, coercion might deter researchers who would defend
the status quo but fear being branded "politically incorrect."
"[B]efore we presume to review the scholarly performance
of our tenured colleagues with eventual dismissal being even a
remote and indirect possible consequence, we are obliged to
confront and resolve a host of issues concerning 'legal
scholarship,' academic freedom, and tenure." Hollingsworth,
supra note 37, at 146.
41

44 Id. at 158.

See also Denise K. Magner, Beyond Tenure,
July 21, 1995, at A13: "It's absolutely
necessary to have periods of quiescence, periods of incubation,
that to the outside observer appear to be wastes of time." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,

Alternatively, professors who are deterred from exploring
their true interests in print through subtle coercion might
respond to this disincentive by focusing on their transmissionof-knowledge objective.
45

Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 362. "Tenure protects
research from being quashed and people from being punished
for their expression. And it protects people against arbitrary
actions by administrators. Abolishing it would create open
season on selected faculty." Arthur Raines & William H.
Wallace, Tenured and Untouchable. .. As Faculty Ought to Be,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1996, at A15.
36

See William G. Hollingsworth, Controlling Post-Tenure
Scholarship: A Brave New World Beckons?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
37
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46

See Stewart Macaulay, FrankRemington: Definingthe Law

Professor's Job, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 553, 553 n.2 (noting
difficulty of ascertaining the extent of an individual's
contribution to a group project during peer review).
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Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 160.
Indeed,
Hollingsworth contends that a "publish early and publish often"
requirement penalizes the most valuable research efforts because
a professor places herself at greater risk of "an unpublishable or
... acutely embarrassing published outcome" by pursuing more
creative topics. Id. at 169.
47

58

See Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 1, at 325 n.2.

59 See generally Rebecca Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and
Academic Values in SponsoredResearch, 66 TEx. L. Rv. 1363,
1374 (1988), cited in Rabban, supra note 16, at 1406-07 n.6.
60

As one professor has written:

Id. at 141.
See Peter Applebome, Profit Squeeze for
PublishersMakes Tenure More Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1996, at Al (noting that tenure procedures may have to change
due to publishers' reduced willingness to publish "economically
marginal books").
4

Tenure status is never meant to convey permanent
ownership of office or faculty position without
regard to quality of work or meritoriousness after
the granting of such status. Rather, the status is
granted upon the implied condition that the
officeholder will continue the high level of service,
quality, and merit for which it was awarded.

RosovsKY, THE UNIvERSIY: AN OWNER's MANUAL
183 (1990) (quoted in Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 333).

49

HENRY

m Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 333.
51

Id. at 334.

52

Id. at 333.

This stability may be articulated as "the
assurance that one can get on with one's work without much
interference, that one has status in the company of learned men
and women, [and] that one can grow old without fearing the axe
of age discrimination." Id.

Letter from Howard L. Oleck, Professor Emeritus of Law,
Stetson University Law School, to Michael I. Swygert and
Nathaniel E. Gozansky (1985), quoted in Swygert & Gozansky,
supra note 1, at 355.
61

William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary Explanation,

and 'Defense,'57AAUP BULL. 328 (1971), quoted in Brown &
Kurland, supra note 7, at 325.
62

Id. See also infra Part VI.C (considering issue of adequate

cause).
Id. Tenure protects the ability of tenured faculty members
to commit to long-term projects because positive judgments
about the value of an individual's contribution to the legal
research community can only be made in retrospect, years later.
See Rabban, supra note 16, at 1426-27.
53

m The related benefit of having a stable staff is obviously
contingent on the career choices of many professors, for
"[t]enure commits the institution to the individual but not the
individual to the institution." Report of the Association of
American Law Schools Special Committee on Tenure and the
TenuringProcess,42 J. LEGAL EDUc. 477,480 (1992).

63

E.g., Marianne Wesson & Sandra Johnson, Post-Tenure
Review and Faculty Revitalization, ACADEME, May-June 1991,
at 54.
64

65

5

See id.

William Hollingsworth points out that pre-tenure evaluation
during the probationary period is tolerated merely because it is a
temporary restriction on the individual's autonomy. The
ultimate goal is to certify that a professor has demonstrated
professional growth so that he or she can be trusted to "selfdefine and self-regulate his or her own mission."
See
Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 156.
57

402

Id. at 55.

See infra note 79 (observing that tenure process may foster
factionalism).
6

67

55 Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 334. Such continuous
monitoring of specialized faculty, it is said, is unnecessary and
costly in time and resources, partly because only an equally
specialized peer can properly perform the review. Id.

id.

For a report of competing arguments for and against tenure,

see Raines & Wallace, supra note 36.
68

Licata, supra note 14, at v.

At American University,

Washington College of Law, the relevant Faculty Manual
language on post-tenure review states: "Tenured faculty will be
evaluated at least triennially by the Committee on Rank and
Tenure and apprised of the results." Washington College of
Law, Faculty Manual 24 (1991). Despite this directive, the
Rank and Tenure Committee has never conducted post-tenure
review. Many faculty believe the reason is that the committee
has implicitly delegated the function to the Dean, who conducts
annual merit reviews for the purpose of determining the level of
salary increases.
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Licata, supra note 14, at 38 (quoting former Secretary of
Education and current head of Empower America, William J.
Bennett). See also Brooks, supra note 5, at 358 ("T]he
academic community must step forward and fulfill its policing
function. . . Considering the alternative, outside interference
with academic decisions, it seems a small price to pay.").
69

70

Wesson & Johnson, supra note 64, at 54. The American

Association of University Professors recognized the protective
aspect of post-tenure review as early as 1915, warning that, if
professors "should prove [themselves] unwilling to purge [their]
ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, or to prevent the
freedom which [they] claim[ ] in the name of science from being
used as a shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for
uncritical and intemperate partisanship, it is certain that the task
will be performed by others." HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 166
(citing AMERICAN AssocIAON OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
THE 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 170 (1915) (citation
omitted)).
This concern will probably be more acute at public, rather
than private, institutions. Fearing the specter of state regulation,
some institutions have introduced their own systems of posttenure review. See Associated Press, U. Va. Ponders PostTenure Job Reviews, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 1995,
at B1. Professor Richard Chait of the University of Maryland
said, "I think institutions have been politically astute to
recognize [that] ... post-tenure review may just quell some of
that dissent." Id See also Manuel T. Pacheco, An Experiment:
Arizona International Campus May Become a Test Site for
Tenure, ARiz. DAILY STAR, Jan. 11, 1996, at I IA ('The
University of Arizona is experimenting with post-tenure review
on their own initiative. . .without waiting for external
pressure.").
71

77 See Licata, supranote 14, at 8 ("[T]he principle of tenure
is
not the culprit[,] . . . the individual interpretation and
application of it is . . . The problems with which tenure is

clearly implicated arise not from anything in the principle itself
but from deficiencies in the operation of the tenure system in
individual institutions.").
See supra note 12 (noting that protected environment of
peer review requires careful administration).
78

79 "The tenure system, by definition,

adversely effects
quality[,]... produc[ing] personal insecurity, factions, internal
conflict and tragedy." Mixon & Otto, supra note 12, at 479. It
"violates the quality principle that employees be hired carefully,
because tenure review anticipates that the unfit will be identified
and rejected." Id.
so

Licata, supra note 14, at v. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 354

(stating that conclusions from post-tenure review should reflect
"the general understandings and customs of the particular
university and the academic community as a whole.").
s

Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 1, at 364.

82

Id. at 366.

83

Id.

See supranote 53. But see Magner, supra note 44, at A13

(arguing that annual performance reviews no longer motivate
faculty effectively because less money for merit-pay increases is
available). An Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University
Law School replied that tenured faculty members face other
forms of pressure to maintain positive performance "in order to
attain the rank of full professor [or] . . . a chaired
professorship." Matin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of
Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 367, 381
(1990).
72

See Mixon & Otto, supra note 12, at 440. The authors
suggest that law professors will resist changes that challenge
their individual positions because they are at the center of an
educational system and profession that encourage adversarial
negotiating and emphasize external incentives for performance.
Id. at 456.
76

Wesson & Johnson, supra note 64, at 54.

73 Id.
74

See Scordato, supranote 71, at 402.

75

Magner, supra note 44, at A16.

Johnson, supranote 64, at 54.
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Id. at 365. Swygert and Gozansky emphasize that it is
crucial to limit the scope of the review to the existence of
activity, not whether the activity is praiseworthy. Id. at 365
n.76.
84

85

But see Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 146 n.32.

Hollingsworth explicitly criticizes Swygert and Gozansky's
suggestions. He feels that, despite their verbal commitment to
avoid the evaluation of research content, their use of elusive
terms like "scholarly activity" and "worthwhile" invites just this
type of normative evaluation.
86

Deficient tenured professors might also be motivated by the

embarrassment of reviewing others' performance. Judging
others might be a compelling reminder of their own professional
responsibilities.
See also Wesson &
17

See Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 1, at 364.
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"

Id. at 367.

'9 Id. at 368.

101 Betsy Draine, Plan for Post-Tenure Review Focuses on

Career Development, UW Press Release (Feb. 10,
<http://www.wisc.edu>.

1993)

University of Wisconsin at Madison Faculty, Policy on the

90 Faculty colloquia may occur more frequently than this.
Emory Law School, for example, holds them on a monthly
basis. Id. at 368 n.85.

102

9' Id. at 369.

103

id.

92

'04

Other schools have provided for re-evaluation of post-tenure

id.

Goodman, supra note 3, at 410. It is not clear whether this
university-wide program of review extends to law faculty.
93

This difference may simply reflect the fact that Swygert and
Gozansky proposed models for peer review in law schools;
university-wide systems and structures may necessarily be
different.
94

95

Goodman, supranote 3, at 413.

96

Goodman stresses that faculty receptivity to the plan was

largely the result of allowing the faculty to contribute to the
formulation of standards. Id. at 415.
97

Id. at 413-15.

98 Merit salary increases have not been available at the
University of Hawaii since 1987, but this provision was
included in case such funds became available subsequently.
University of Hawaii at Manoa, Procedures for Evaluation of
Faculty, June 1994, at 1 n.1.

Review of Tenured Faculty, Faculty Doc. 1001b (adopted Apr.
19, 1993).

review policies. See, e.g., University of Kentucky Faculty
Senate Meeting Minutes, Nov. 8, 1993 (mandating that the
system be reviewed after four-year trial period).
105

See also Magner, supra note 44, at A16 ("The point [of

post-tenure review] is not just to reform bad professors; it's also
to recognize and assist good ones .... The reviews ... will
provide an occasion for roses as well as brickbats.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
'06 Id. The program does not stipulate whether these third
parties are faculty members or persons outside of the university.
107

Wesson & Johnson, supra note 64, at 53.

10'

Id. at 54.

109 Id.

110Id. at 53 (quoting amendment to the Laws of Regents

(adopted Oct. 22, 1982)).
1 Id. The policy does not state, however, how many faculty

99 University of Wisconsin at Madison Faculty, Policy on the
Review of Tenured Faculty, Faculty Doe. 1001b (adopted Apr.
19, 1993). Georgia's public colleges and universities started
reviewing tenured faculty in 1996. The system is quite similar
to that employed at the University of Wisconsin; both were
developed by Stephen Portch, now chancellor of the university
system in Georgia. See Reagan Walker, In This Age of Job
Anxiety, Tenure's Time May Be Up, AnT. J. CONST., Apr. 30,
1995, at GI.
1oo Post-tenure review systems commonly try to foster
professional development. For example, Kentucky designed its
system "to provide effective evaluation, useful feedback,
appropriate intervention, and timely and affirmative assistance
to ensure that every faculty member continues to experience
professional development and accomplishment during the
various phases of his or her career." University of Kentucky
Faculty Senate Meeting, Nov. 8, 1993.

peers are involved in the review process.
James Harper, Up for the Regent's Review Today: Should
Professors Get More Elaborate Evaluations After Tenure?. ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at 4B.
12

113

Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Commission on Faculty'

Affairs Resolution 1995-96B: Post-Tenure Review Process,
Mar. 8, 1996. For information about the CFA resolution and
policies on post-tenure review, contact Paul Metz via email at
pmetz@vt.edu.
114

Virginia

Polytechnic

Institute,

Post-Tenure

Review

Implementation Timetable, Apr. 8, 1996.
"' See infra Part VI.C.
116

Paul Metz, Presentation

on

Post-Tenure

Review

to

Academic Affairs Committee, Apr. 1996.
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See Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Faculty Handbook §
2.9.1, Annual Evaluation and Salary Adjustments.
17

1"

Metz, supranote 116.

119

Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Faculty Handbook § 2.9.4,

Swygert and Gozansky's faculty colloquia model would be
most appropriate, since it demands the fewest faculty hours of
all of the systems.
129 Halee

Post-Tenure Review.
120

Id. This finding rebuts the unsatisfactory evaluation. The

review is then complete. An unsatisfactory rating in any
subsequent year constitutes a first violation; in other words, the
professor gets a clean slate.
121

Burg,

Memorandum on

Evaluation, in EMPLOYMENT IssuEs IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A
LEGAL COMPENDIum 233, 255 (Jean S. Sagan & Thomas P.

Rebel eds., 1995).
130

Id.

131

Id.

132 Id. This response could be attributed to the respondents'

Id.

Id.
Virginia Tech's remediation is essentially the
professional development plan at Kentucky. At Virginia Tech,
however, the department chair reviews the professor's progress
at least twice annually. The plan does not designate a time
period for implementation. The chair provides the review
committee with a written report after each meeting and at the
end of the time period for remediation. Then the committee can
give the professor a satisfactory rating or recommend a sanction,
including dismissal. Id.
12

belief that the development plans were inadequate and
ineffective at reinvigorating underperformers among the faculty.
3

Id. at 256.

134

Id.

135

id.

136

Id.

123

Swygert & Gozansky, supranote 1, at 366.

137 Wesson & Johnson, supranote 64.

124

For example, New Mexico adopted a post-tenure review

131

system by statute. See N.M.
1978 & Supp. 1995).

STAT. ANN.

Id. at 53-54.

§ 21-1-7.1 (Michie
139 Id. at

54-55.

Id. at 55.

12S rd.

140

126 Virginia Tech Faculty Handbook § 2.9.4, Post-Tenure

141 Id. at

56.

Review. The departmental promotion and tenure committee
conducts the reviews.

142 Id. at

55-56.

143 Id. at

56-57.

127
128

Swygert & Gozansky, supranote 1, at 364-67.
Some faculty members feel that peer review is not worth

their time or effort. One faculty member evaluating Colorado's
post-tenure review system stated that "he felt strangled by the
university bureaucracy and regarded the demand that his
department conduct the review as just another diversion from
the real work of teaching and scholarship that he and his
colleagues would like to pursue." Wesson & Johnson, supra
note 64, at 56. See Richard Edwards, Can Post-TenureReview
Help Us Save the Tenure System?, ACADEmE, May-June 1997,

at 26, 31 ("[r]he imposition of post-tenure review will cost
resources, most particularly faculty (and administrators') time,
and... meaningful, nonsuperficial reviews will cost more than
trivial ones."). If a university or law school's faculty felt that
peer reviews would be a waste of precious time, then perhaps
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144 See Madeleine J. Goodman, The Review of Tenured Faculty
at a Research University: Outcomes and Appraisals, 18 REv.
HIGHER EDUC. 83 (1994).
145

Id. at 87.

146 Id. For the eight years preceding the implementation of
post-tenure review, the annual growth rate for funding of grants
had been less than three percent. Id.
147

Id.

Id. This rate of retirement was more than double the normal
rate among tenured faculty, effectively returning the retirement
148

405
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rate to what it had been prior to the uncapping of the mandatory
retirement age in 1986. Id. Goodman acknowledged that a
desire to avoid review had caused some of the retirements, but
responded that "the university has every right to expect its
senior faculty, no less than its probationers, to maintain fair and
reasonable levels of academic performance and achievement, as
understood by their faculty peers." Id. at 93.

Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty
Publication Study: Comparisons of Law School Productivity,

35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373 (1985).
166 Id. at

167

356.

See supra Part III.A (identifying Swygert and Gozansky's

recommendations).
149

Id. at 87.

ISO

Id. at 88.

151

Id. Of those 16 faculty members, three received favorable

rulings from the appeals committee, five retired, seven
formulated development plans, and one "was reassigned to a
more congenial unit." Id.
112

Id. at 91-92.

153

Id.

168

Brooks, supra note 5, at 335.

169

Id. While Brooks' test concerns when faculty should be

dismissed for adequate cause, it also helps to determine what to
look for when performing post-tenure reviews.
170 Id.

'm Id. at 88. Of those 72 faculty members, 28 had overcome
their deficiencieg by June 1993. Twenty professors who had
formulated development plans left the university (19 retired, one
died). Twenty-four of the faculty members were still working
on their development plans at the time of Goodman's 1994
publication. Id. at 88-89.

Id. at 93.

156

id.

See Goodman, supra note 3, at 418-22 (setting forth
typology of cases).
Id.

159

Id. at418.

at 347.

This element presumes that remedial actions

short of dismissal have failed, and that dismissal is a last resort.
Id. Post-tenure review should suggest a suitable plan of action
to reform severely deficient performance. Career-development
plans would provide the professor with direction and allow for
improvement before the severe action of dismissal was
considered.
172

157

158

Brooks notes that inquiry into a professor's

involvement should focus only on whether the participation is
"competent." Evaluating.the professor's views is not allowed.
Id. at 348.
171 Id.

155

at 347.

Id. at 347. This element presumes that academic freedom

will be protected, because only experts will make
determinations of competence. Id. at 354. Brooks also stresses
that the administration cannot participate in peer review: "Their
opinions and attitudes are too easily colored by budgets,
recruiting and internal university politics rather than the
requirements of academic freedom." Id. at 358.
173

Id. at 347.

174 Hollingsworth mailed questionnaires to law school deans
'60

Id. at419.

161

Id.at 420.

162

Id. at 421.

163

Id. at 422.

around the country asking them to predict how several
hypothetical professors would be dealt with after a round of
post-tenure review. See Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 14748.
175

Swygert and Gozansky's million-dollar question-perhaps
literally-is, "[w]hat, if anything, can be done to increase the
level of productivity among senior law faculty members?"
Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 1, at 356.
164

Id. at 357-59.

406

The study is documented in Michael I.

hypothetical

Professor

N.

Toto, for

example, devotes all his time to the study of the world's major
languages. His goal: to write the definitive "universal law of
nations" in order to save humanity. The issue posed by the
hypothetical is whether an apparently "unreasonable" choice of
research of material should lead to reprimand. Id. at 151-66.
176

165

Hollingsworth's

[A]t least with respect to threat of termination,
academic freedom necessitates that the tenured
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professor be free of a professional reasonableness
requirement as to her scholarship. No matter how
lax, liberal, or otherwise "reasonable" any such
reasonableness requirements may be, it would
perpetually indenture the individual to a coercive
consensus whose endless tyranny cannot be
justified.

191 Id.
'92 Id. at 2.
'

Id. at 3.

194

Brooks, supra note 5, at 356.

Id. at 155.
195 Id.

,7 Several phrases have been used to describe this goal, such as
George Geis' notion of "formative evaluation" and Charles
Larsey's "post-tenure development." See Goodman, supra note
3, at 409 (discussing various formulations of the concept of
post-tenure review as a tool of professional development).

196 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and
Tenure, and Interpretive Comments, reprintedin AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3-9 (1984), cited in Swygert &
Gozansky, supra note 1, at 361.

178 See supraParts II.A and II.B (addressing academic freedom

197 American Bar Association, Standardsfor Approval of Law

and job security, respectively).

Schools and Interpretations,Annex 1 (1995).

179

Hollingsworth is such an opponent of dismissal.

He says

that termination of Professor N. Toto (discussed supra note 175
and accompanying text) would be unjustified because it would
subordinate scholarly freedom to lesser values. Hollingsworth,
supra note 37, at 162. These lesser values include the prestige
of the university and alleged correlations between publication
frequency and classroom effectiveness. Id. at 161-62.

198 Periodically, the AAUP has promulgated Statements on
Professional Ethics to clarify the ethical obligations of the
teaching profession. See HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 174-75
(providing text of 1966 Statement and comparing it to similar
AAUP Statement published in 1970).
'99

CoMMIssIoN ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION,

FACULTY TENURE 75 (1973), cited in Brown & Kurland, supra
ISo

Id. at 163.

note 7, at 328.

181

Id. at 164-65.

200 Robert M. Hendrickson, Removing Tenured Faculty For

182 Id. at 165-66.

Cause, 44 EDUC. L. REP. 483, 491 (1988), cited in Brooks,
supra note 5, at 335 n.25.
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